Abstract
For at least the last decade, evaluation of the benefits of research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RD 3 ) by the U.S. Department of Energy has been conducted using deterministic forecasts that unrealistically presume we can precisely foresee our future 10, 25, or even 50 years hence. This effort tries, in a modest way, to begin a process of recognition that the reality of our energy future is rather one rife with uncertainty.
The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) is used by the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE) and Fossil Energy (FE) for their RD 3 benefits evaluation. In order to begin scoping out the uncertainty in these deterministic forecasts, EE and FE designed two futures that differ significantly from the basic NEMS forecast.
A High Fuel Price Scenario and a Carbon Cap Scenario were envisioned to forecast alternative futures and the associated benefits. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) implemented these scenarios into its version of NEMS, NEMS-LBNL, in late 2004, and the Energy Information Agency created six scenarios for FE in early 2005. The creation and implementation of the EE-FE scenarios are explained in this report. Both a Carbon Cap Scenario and a High Fuel Price Scenarios were implemented into the NEMS-LBNL. EIA subsequently modeled similar scenarios using NEMS.
While the EIA and LBNL implementations were in some ways rather different, their forecasts do not significantly diverge. Compared to the Reference Scenario, the High Fuel Price Scenario reduces energy consumption by 4% in 2025, while in the EIA fuel price scenario (known as Scenario 4) reduction from its corresponding reference scenario (known as Scenario 0) in 2025 is marginal. Nonetheless, the 4% demand reduction does not lead to other cascading effects that would significantly differentiate the two scenarios.
The LBNL and EIA carbon scenarios were mostly identical. The only major difference was that LBNL started working with the AEO 2004 NEMS code and EIA was using AEO 2005 NEMS code. Unlike the High Price Scenario the Carbon Cap scenario gives a radically different forecast than the Reference Scenario.
NEMS-LBNL proved that it can handle these alternative scenarios. However, results are price inelastic (for both oil and natural gas prices) within the price range evaluated. Perhaps even higher price paths would lead to a distinctly different forecast than the Reference Scenario. On the other hand, the Carbon Cap Scenario behaves more like an alternative future. The future in the Carbon Cap Scenario has higher electricity prices, reduced driving, more renewable capacity, and reduced energy consumption. The next step for this work is to evaluate the EE benefits under each of the three scenarios. Comparing those three sets of predicted benefits will indicate how much uncertainty is inherent within this sort of deterministic forecasting. This project required EE and FE agreement on a common starting point (Reference Scenario), and common alternative future scenarios. The alternative scenarios were each designed to incorporate a major change to the business-as-usual future incorporated in the Reference Scenario. Berkeley Lab NEMS team had many discussions with the NETL NEMS team, eventually arriving at mutually agreeable definitions of the scenarios. This agreement is described in detail throughout this report. FE-NETL used similar scenarios to the ones Berkeley Lab implemented in NEMS-LBNL for test runs in the GPRA-06 budget cycle.
Introduction
However, in keeping with their standard practice, FE formally requested that the Energy Information Administration (EIA) implement these scenarios in NEMS. EIA completed these cases in February 2005. One major difference between these scenarios and the ones defined previously is that the EIA-FE scenarios use many standard NEMS files that are 9 months more current than NEMS-LBNL. EE and FE conduct their GPRA work on quite different schedules, with the FE effort taking place earlier in the budget cycle. Because the FE scenarios are similar to the jointly established Berkeley Lab ones, and they have been implemented in the AEO 2005 version of NEMS, they are available for use by EE in its current GPRA-07 budget cycle.
Section 2 briefly describes the joint approach to benefits analysis of the EE-FE Working Group, how the two offices worked together to specify common scenarios, and the challenges associated with implementing them in NEMS-LBNL. Section 3 explains the Reference Scenario chosen. Unlike most NEMS-LBNL work, the most recent Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference Scenario was not the starting point; rather, a reference scenario published a few months after the release of AEO 2004 was used.
Section 4 explains the High Fuel Price Scenario. This scenario reflects a future in which the supply of natural gas and oil are restricted, causing significantly higher fuel prices.
Section 5 explains the Carbon Cap Scenario as implemented by Berkeley Lab. This scenario caps annual U.S. carbon emissions at 2003 levels, approximately 1580 million metric tons of carbon (MtC). The carbon cap is implemented through a simple cap-and-trade regime. This limit reduces projected carbon emissions by more than 600 MtC, or about 29%, by 2025.
Section 6 discusses the three emissions scenarios and two fuel price scenarios that EIA created for FE. Results are presented to highlight differences among the EIA scenarios.
Section 7 compares the EIA-FE scenarios with the Berkeley Lab scenarios.
Section 8 summarizes the main conclusions of this work while Section 9 goes over EE and Berkeley Lab's next steps for evaluating how alternative scenarios fit into model forecasting.
Joint Scenarios for EE and FE
During 2004, the EE-FE Working Group defined a common Reference Scenario and two alternative scenarios to potentially serve as common scenarios for the two offices. The central challenge was merging different analysis perspectives into a unified approach. Initially, the two DOE offices explained and exchanged their existing approaches, and then the Working Group negotiated new scenarios in detail that would satisfy both EE and FE's requirements. Finally, the implementation of these scenarios and the benefits analysis was discussed in detail to reach a common starting point for as many of the small yet potentially divergent assumptions as possible. While the Working Group determined the specifications for the scenarios, Berkeley Lab was responsible for the actual implementation into NEMS-LBNL.
Each scenario will have versions, or cases. The case for each scenario that incorporate none of the baseline or program characteristics are herein called the static case. The intent of the Working Group is that the three scenarios' Static Cases should be almost identical and will be used for comparison between EE and FE. However, the actual benefit analyses will be done separately using the common scenarios but different analysis approaches. EE and FE will both end up with at least nine cases, laid out in Table 1 .
For EE's analysis, each scenario's Static Case will be run along with a Baseline Case and Program Case. In all scenarios, each office keeps the other's programs constant throughout all three cases. In other words, there has been no effort to date to develop a common analysis method, or to jointly conduct one. However, that will change soon, as EE, FE, as well as the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and Office of Electric Delivery and Energy Reliability try to develop joint Cases and estimates starting with GPRA-08 budget request. 
Extreme Scenario Limitations
NEMS is intended to produce the annual AEO Reference Scenario, and scenarios that fall outside this range are not easily implemented and are not guaranteed by EIA. Specifically, surprise scenarios with unexpected shocks cannot be readily implemented. The surprise factor is reduced by NEMS's various look-ahead assumptions that soften the blow of coming change. Also, the model can become unstable if sudden extreme changes are encountered. The scenarios chosen, therefore, should not be interpreted as discontinuous surprises, but rather as significant deviations from the Reference Scenario path.
A separate analysis was conducted by Berkeley Lab to compare the scenarios chosen with other scenario analyses that have been done. The authors concluded that the High Fuel Scenario is reasonable though perhaps the price increases were too conservative. The Carbon Cap Scenario was described as "less aggressive than" some others found in the literature, "…[yet] aggressive in the near term, and may explore the limits of NEMS…" 2 .
Overcoming Other Challenges to Using NEMS-LBNL
Developing the High Fuel Price and Carbon Cap Scenarios was tricky. Dreaming up alternative paths was one thing, but making NEMS-LBNL follow them was something else entirely. In NEMS, fuel prices are solutions not input values, except for the price of oil, which is set by world supply and demand. Other fuel prices are determined by domestic supply and demand forecasts.
In order to attain the particular natural gas wellhead prices elaborated on in Section 4, the resource base for Canadian and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports had to be carefully calibrated. All of these calibrations and other corrections took 24 runs, 77 cycles, 3 over the course of six weeks, trying 14 different versions of the natural gas input file, ngmisc. Eventually, with the help of EIA analysts, all of the problems were eliminated and the price targets were hit.
The Carbon Cap Scenario, in contrast to High Fuel Price Scenario, merely involved changing inputs to NEMS-LBNL. However, carbon capped scenarios in NEMS-LBNL are much harder to solve and converge. 4 The NEMS-LBNL work refining the Carbon Cap Scenario took approximately 30 runs, 630 cycles, over six weeks. Each carbon scenario cycle took between 45 and 80 minutes to execute. Originally an annual carbon cap of 1480 MtC was envisioned for this scenario but after a month and hundreds of hours without approaching EIA's convergence criterion, the carbon cap target was eased to 1580 MtC.
The Working Group believes that the extensive number cycles needed for convergence is due to the limited options for reducing carbon emissions. Limited options cause the model to oscillate between reduction strategies; and results that oscillate significantly cannot be considered converged.
Reference Scenario
Normally, Berkeley Lab uses EIA's latest AEO version of NEMS as its Reference Scenario for most all of its NEMS-LBNL related analysis. This is updated once a year after the new AEO is published. For these joint scenarios, however, the AEO 2004 Reference Scenario was deemed an inadequate starting point. At the outset of the project, both EE and FE analysts were using code updated post-AEO 2004. Therefore the Working Group chose to start with an EIA published reference scenario from a May 2004 emissions report 5 , which will be subsequently called the Reference Scenario.
The differences between the two versions of NEMS, the Reference Scenario and AEO 2004 Scenario, include updates, corrections, and a few revised assumptions. According to EIA, 6 most of the changes had minor impacts relative to the AEO 2004 Scenario results. These changes are explained in Appendix A, which was provided by EIA. 
High Fuel Price Scenario
This scenario was designed to represent a future with fuel prices significantly higher than the Reference Scenario's fuel prices. Prices begin to deviate from the Reference Scenario around 2010. The natural gas supply is restricted to cause natural gas prices to reach a minimum of The fuel prices reached in this scenario are compared with what is found in the Reference Scenario below in Figures 1 and 4 . Coal prices through 2025 are not manipulated, and reach whatever level that NEMS-LBNL determines, given the target natural gas and oil prices.
Oil Prices
The change needed to reach the oil price path was straightforward. The world oil price used in NEMS is exogenous, so the price path was merely redefined. World oil price is made to increase significantly from 2010 to 2019 and then level off, as shown in Figure 1 . A few other code changes were made that are consistent with those changes made by EIA to create their High World Oil Price Case. Figure 2 shows how the world oil price modification affects U.S. oil demand. The elasticity of oil demand relative to world oil price can be seen below in Figure 3 . Price elasticity of demand is defined as the absolute value of the percent change in demand divided by the percent change in price. U.S. petroleum demand is mostly inelastic to price according to the model within the price range shown in Figure 1 ; since a 50% price increase reduces demand by less than 7 % from 2020-2025. 
Natural Gas Wellhead Prices
Forcing a higher natural gas wellhead price was more difficult. Figure 4 shows the wellhead prices achieved. Prices begin to diverge before 2010. The Working Group agreed that the desired natural gas price trajectory is more important than the means by which the natural gas supply is restricted. Nonetheless, the choice of supply restrictions implemented, as listed below, was in large measure motivated by a desire to inhibit supply primarily from sources outside the contiguous states, thereby disturbing domestic supply assumptions and logic as little as possible. The techniques used to restrict natural gas supplies are as follows:
• Construction of an Alaska natural gas pipeline is assumed delayed and will not be in operation before 2025.
• Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin gas supplies (both conventional and coalbed methane) are reduced by 25 percent relative to the Reference Scenario.
• No new LNG facilities are allowed on U.S. shores except for Region 10, Florida, since it actually represents a planned Bahamas plant.
• The Baja California planned LNG facility is allowed to double in size once built whereas in the Reference Scenario it can triple in capacity.
• The existing four U.S. LNG facilities (Cove Point, Elba Island, Lake Charles, and Everett-DistriGas) are not allowed to expand as much as allowed under Reference Scenario conditions.
Beyond 2025, Arctic and LNG gas supplies are further restricted until the price target is met.
The net result of these restrictions is supply reductions of 0.8 trillion cubic feet in 2015 and 3.4 trillion cubic feet in 2025 as shown in Figure 5 . Specifically, LNG supplies are 3 trillion cubic feet less and Canadian imports about 2 trillion cubic feet less than for the Reference Scenario in 2025. With higher prices and limited international supplies, it makes sense that some of the slack is offset by increased domestic production. 
Results

Energy Prices and Consumption
Total energy consumption is shown in Figure 6 , and unsurprisingly, demand slackens a little bit (4% in 2025) as a result of the higher world oil and natural gas wellhead prices. A comparison of overall non-renewable energy expenses is shown in Figure 7 . Total national expenses get as much as 15% higher in the middle of the forecast, though by 2025 that gap narrows back to 10% higher. 
Average Electricity Prices
Average electricity prices are nudged higher, mostly as a result of the higher natural gas prices. Figure 8 shows that at its highest point in 2019, average electricity prices reach 10% higher than the Reference Scenario. By 2025, though, the divergence is reduced to just 3%, 7.1 versus 6.9 cents per kWh. Electricity prices diverge more in 2019 than in 2025 because coal and natural gas prices increase more dramatically in the early years, and by 2020 prices start to converge again. Additionally, between 2019 and 2025 in the High Fuel Price Scenario natural gas's share of electric generation falls from 14% ( Figure  9 ) to 11% (Figure 10 ). 
Carbon Cap Scenario
The Working Group wanted to implement a fairly severe carbon cap. U.S. carbon emissions are reduced to approximately 1580 million metric tons of carbon by the year 2016. After 2016, this cap is held constant through 2050, which is equivalent to stabilizing U.S. carbon emissions at roughly 2003 levels. 11 The carbon cap is implemented through a simple cap-and-trade regime and covers all energy sectors.
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In order to simplify potential modeling problems, the Working Group decided to institute a gradual carbon emission reduction leading to the "severe" cap; in other words, this is not intended as a surprise scenario. In this scenario, the carbon emission cap is reduced gradually between 2011 and 2016, see Figure 11 .
New nuclear plants were restricted to the same contribution as in the Reference Scenario. Sequestration technology plants were available to help meet the cap. Sequestration technology available in NEMS comes in two types, either an "Advanced Coal" or "Combined Cycle" plant with sequestration. The characteristic differences of sequestration plants are that they are more expensive to build and operate, cannot be built until 2010, and remove 90% of carbon emissions. The proliferation of new sequestration capacity in this scenario does not begin until well after implementation of the cap, around 2022, see Figure 12 . 
Carbon Allowance Price
The carbon cap leads to a non-zero market clearing price for carbon allowances, which does not exist in the Reference Scenario. Allowance prices peak at $191 per ton 13 in 2016 and then gradually moderate (Figure 13 ). These prices are within the range that Wiser & Bolinger (2004) identified while evaluating other carbon restricted forecasts for allowance prices. 
Electricity Prices
One direct effect of carbon allowance price is that average electricity prices jump about 40% as the cap is phased in. After five years electricity prices flatten out and parallel those of the Reference Scenario. Figure 14 shows the increase in electricity prices due to the 1580 MtC cap. Prices approach ten cents per kWh starting in 2016 compared to about seven cents in the Reference Scenario. 
Transportation Sector
Some of the most direct impacts of the carbon cap are seen in the transportation sector. Light duty vehicle gasoline consumption is reduced by 17% in 2025 in the Carbon Cap Scenario compared to the Reference Scenario. Interestingly, most of this comes from reduced driving, not from improved fuel economy. Figure 15 shows light duty miles are reduced by 15%, while Figure 16 shows that light duty fuel economy improves merely by 5% in 2025. 
Other Results of Carbon Cap
Capping carbon emissions leads to higher national energy expenditures, (Figure 17 ). This is due to more expensive generating technologies (instead of coal, there are sequestration and renewable plants), and the cost of emissions allowances. Allowance prices account for between 33% and 50% of difference seen in Figure 17 . With the carbon restriction, U.S. renewable capacity is almost triple the Reference Case forecast by 2025, as seen in Figure 18 . Wind and biomass capacity account for over 90% of the additional capacity. The Carbon Cap Scenario forecasts slower growth in overall energy consumption, Figure 19 . While natural gas and petroleum use is more or less the same, coal use is severely reduced and the large renewable growth only offsets a fraction of the coal reduction. The next two sections will briefly summarize the results from the two distinct groups of scenarios, the emission scenarios and the fuel price scenarios. The EIA-FE scenarios will be referred to by their number henceforth.
EIA-FE Emissions Scenarios
Description of Emissions Scenarios
Scenario 1 is a multiple pollutant scenario. It tries to limit sulfur dioxide emissions to 4.5 million short tons by 2010 and 3.0 million short tons by 2018. NO X has a 33 state limit of 1.6 million short tons by 2010 and 1.3 million short tons by 2018. The mercury emission targets are 45 short tons by 2010 and 30 short tons by 2018. . Scenario 2 has carbon emissions in the electric sector limited starting in 2009. This cap affects only the 40% of the total carbon emissions since 60% of carbon emissions come from buildings, industrial, or transportation. Table 4 shows how electric sector carbon emissions deviate in Scenario 2 from Scenario 0. 
Results of Emissions Scenarios
The next four figures compare emissions of the three emission scenarios with those from Scenario 0. Figure 20 shows the relative carbon reductions for Scenarios 2 and 3. It is interesting that the multi-pollutant limits in Scenario 1 do not have any noticeable secondary effect on carbon. Nonetheless, the carbon limits can affect the emissions of other pollutants. While Scenario 2 has identical SO 2 emissions as Scenario 0, in Figure 21 , one can see that the larger carbon reductions in Scenario 3 lead to lower SO 2 emissions. This is due to the fact that coal consumption is cut in half by 2025 in Scenario 3. 
Figure 21 Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
All three emission scenarios lead to reduced NO X emissions, as shown in Figure 22 . Again Scenario 1 has the lowest NO X emissions, followed by Scenario 3 and then Scenario 2. By the end of the forecast the NO X , emissions are about the same in Scenario 1 and 3. The mercury emissions shown in Figure 23 , below, look almost identical to the NO x emission pattern, except that Scenario 3 surpasses Scenario 1's mercury emission target. 
Figure 23 Mercury Emissions
Average electricity prices seem to be most influenced by carbon limits. The SO 2 , NO X, and mercury limits used in Scenario 1, while dramatic as explained above, do not lead to higher electricity prices in Figure 24 . These limits lead to a lot of extra NO X control technology and scrubbers -about 120 GW of each -but those do not in turn lead to other significant changes in the forecast. Renewable capacity growth, shown in Figure 26 , follows the same pattern as most of the other results from these emission scenarios. Only a carbon cap leads to more renewable capacity and the more extreme the case the more growth. The natural gas wellhead price in Scenario 4 and 5 are virtually identical, shown below in Figure  28 . There does not seem to be any secondary effects in NEMS that has the higher world oil prices disturbing the wellhead price solution. 
Results Fuel Price Scenarios
The fuel price scenarios have almost no effect on total capacity and renewable capacity forecasts. Even the reduction in annual consumption, shown below in Figure 29 , is slight, even less than seen in Figure 6 earlier. Electricity prices increase similarly in both Scenario 4 and 5, which is seen in Figure 30 . As was the case with the High Fuel Price Scenario (Figure 7 ), non-renewable energy expenditures increase in Scenarios 4 and 5, which is seen in Figure 31 . Table 5 : The fuel price forecasts represent the other major differences in AEO 2005 relative to AEO 2004. Table 6 shows that fossil fuel prices start much higher early in the forecast about 40% for oil and natural gas, 5% for coal. By the end of the forecast, AEO 2005 has all of these prices between 5% and 10% higher. 
Scenario 4 Compared to High Fuel Price Scenario
Scenario 4 Figure 33 shows that both Scenario 4 and the High Fuel Price Scenario project similar natural gas wellhead forecasts beyond 2011. Once again, the discrepancy in the earlier year's forecast is due to the fact that AEO 2005 projects natural gas prices staying higher in the short-term. Figure 34 . The discrepancy parallels the differences in world oil price between the two forecasts. In the target years, 2015 and 2025, the energy expenses are pretty close to the same, in the interim Scenario 4 is lower, and from 2006 to 2011 expenses are higher. The conclusion drawn is that the different starting point and trajectories taken to hit the world oil price targets are mostly responsible for the energy expenditure differential not other variations in assumptions between the scenarios. 
Scenario 3 compared to Carbon Cap Scenario
Scenario 3 has the same carbon emissions target as the Carbon Cap Scenario. However, the cap starts to be phased in a few years earlier, as shown in Figure 35 . The other noticeable difference between these scenarios is that Scenario 3 allows for nuclear plant builds beyond what Scenario 0 forecasts. Table 7 shows how much higher the nuclear growth is in Scenario 3; four gigawatts (GW) higher in 2015, up to 41 GW higher in 2025. Even with the difference in nuclear capacity growth, Scenario 3 and the Carbon Cap Scenario are very similar. Figure 36 shows the capacity difference by technology group between each set of carbon and reference scenarios for 2025. For example, Scenario 3 has about 50 GW more sequestration capacity in 2025 than Scenario 0, while the Carbon Cap Scenario has 273 GW more renewable and sequestration capacity combined and 282 GW less fossil and other capacity in 2025 than the Reference Scenario. The net capacity change is pretty similar in both sets of scenarios.
The NEMS supply-side technologies that are zero or low carbon emitting technologies are renewables, nuclear, and sequestration. When looking at capacity growth of these three categories together, the nuclear growth in the EIA scenarios is offset by more renewable and sequestration capacity in the Berkeley Lab scenarios. Most everything else is barely indistinguishable between Scenario 3 and the Carbon Cap scenario. Figure 37 shows the fuel consumption forecasts. The slopes of these scenarios are strikingly similar to those of the carbon emissions seen in Figure 35 . The total non-renewable energy expenses are more different but that is generally during the periods where the cap is phased in differently, note Figure 38 . 
Figure 38 Total Non-Renewable Energy Expenses Comparison
A notable difference that will require further evaluation is that EIA has achieved quicker convergence with the newer version of the model. The source of this improvement is not currently known. Therefore, determining the appropriate convergence criteria for a carbon constrained scenario is a priority for the future use of NEMS-LBNL.
Summary of Differences between EIA and Berkeley Lab Scenarios
The scenarios designed by EIA for FE are distinct from the Berkeley Lab scenarios. The most fundamental difference is that the EIA-FE scenarios are based on AEO 2005 while Berkeley Lab scenarios are based on AEO 2004. The implementation of both Carbon Scenarios is fairly similar, but the High Fuels Scenarios, which were more difficult to execute, had more differences. Nonetheless, the results of the corresponding EIA-FE scenarios seem reasonably consistent overall with those from the Berkeley Lab scenarios.
These scenarios are just Static Cases. Even though most indicators shown in this report suggest that the results are similar, the GPRA analysis measures the sensitivity of these results not the absolute values. While there is no indication that the sensitivity of any of the metrics reported herein differs between Berkeley Lab and EIA-FE scenarios, such a conclusion has not been substantiated.
Conclusions
This work was inspired by an interest in quantifying the uncertainty associated with energy forecasting. Looking at a small sample of alternative futures some conclusions can be drawn that apply within the range that was examined.
• The dramatic price changes in the Higher Fuel Price forecast had limited affects on results. According to NEMS-LBNL price uncertainty leads only to limited changes in consumption. In other words, energy demand is price inelastic, for oil and natural gas prices.
• A future with emissions caps shows a wider range of results.
• The scenarios created by EIA and Berkeley Lab are notably different, however that is mostly because EIA's were based on AEO 2005 and Berkeley Lab's were based on AEO 2004.
• The emissions reductions in Scenario 1 may affect control technology and allowance prices but do not lead to different energy quantity results.
• The EIA and Berkeley Lab implementations of High Fuel Price and Carbon Cap Scenarios have noticeable differences, yet overall results are similar.
Next Steps
The immediate follow-up to this work will be several DOE offices reviewing the scenarios and EE picking which if any scenarios to use in their GPRA-07 analysis that is in progress. There are no compelling reasons to avoid using the EIA scenarios, the results seem to be consistent with Berkeley Lab scenario results, and Berkeley Lab scenarios would still need to be added to AEO 2005 for use this year.
Another step that will be taken shortly in the EE GPRA process is the setting up of the Baseline and Program Reference Cases. These cases can show the effects of this sort of uncertainty on the benefits analysis.
Also, a project looking at a wider representation of alternative energy futures will be commencing shortly at Berkeley Lab. This is an attempt to enumerate fundamental structural differences to the Reference Scenario future.
